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Abstract
An instance of the strongly stable roommates problem with incomplete lists and ties (srti) is an
undirected non-bipartite graph G = (V,E), with an adjacency list being a linearly ordered list
of ties, which are vertices equally good for a given vertex. Ties are disjoint and may contain one
vertex. A matching M is a set of vertex-disjoint edges. An edge {x, y} ∈ E \M is a blocking edge
for M if x is either unmatched or strictly prefers y to its current partner in M , and y is either
unmatched or strictly prefers x to its current partner in M or is indifferent between them. A
matching is strongly stable if there is no blocking edge with respect to it. We present an O(nm)
time algorithm for computing a strongly stable matching, where we denote n = |V | and m = |E|.
The best previously known solution had running time O(m2) [16]. We also give a characterisation
of the set of all strongly stable matchings. We show that there exists a partial order with O(m)
elements representing the set of all strongly stable matchings, and we give an O(nm) algorithm
for constructing such a representation. Our algorithms are based on a simple reduction to the
bipartite version of the problem.
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1 Introduction
An instance of the stable roommates problem with ties and incomplete lists (srti)
involves a non-bipartite graph G = (V,E), where an adjacency list of each vertex is a linearly
ordered list of ties, which are subsets of vertices equally good for a given vertex. Ties are
disjoint and may contain one vertex. Thus if vertices b1 and b2 are neighbours of a in G then
one of the following holds:
a strictly prefers b1 to b2, which we denote by b1 a b2
b1 and b2 are tied on the preference list of a, which we denote by b1 =a b2
a strictly prefers b2 to b1, which we denote by b1 ≺a b2
If vertex a strictly prefers b1 to b2 or is indifferent between them, then we say that a
weakly prefers b1 to b2 and we denote it by b1 a b2. A matching M is a set of edges, no two
of which share an endpoint. Let e = (v, w) be an edge contained in a matching M . Then
we say that vertices v and w are matched in M and that v is the partner of w in M , which
we also denote as v = M(w). If a vertex v has no edge of M incident to it, then we say
that v is free or unmatched in M . An edge (x, y) ∈ E \M is a blocking edge for M if x is
either unmatched or strictly prefers y to its current partner in M , and y is either unmatched
or weakly prefers x to its current partner. A matching is strongly stable if there is no edge
blocking it. The goal is to determine a strongly stable matching of a given instance or to
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report that no such matching exists. The stable marriage problem with ties and
incomplete lists (smti) is a version of the problem, such that the underlying graph G is
bipartite.
Motivation. As the problem name suggests, applications of srti arise in the context of
assigning students to dormitories [13], [14]. In the problem we try to assign students to share
two-person rooms. An instance of srti arises in a natural way based on students preferences
over one another. The notion of strong stability allows us to prevent the following scenarios.
Suppose that we assign a student a to share a room with a student M(a) and a student
b to share a room with a student M(b). Assume also that a and b accept each other as a
potential rommmates and that a prefers b to M(a) but b is indifferent between a and M(b).
Then to improve their situation student a may try to bribe student b, in order to convince b
to accept them. Since b is indifferent between a and M(b), they may be happy to share a
room with a, denying our assignment.
Previous results. Several algorithms for computing a strongly stable matching in bipartite
instances of smti have already been given. Let us denote n = |V |, m = |E|. Irving [5] gave
an O(n4) algorithm for computing strongly stable matchings for instances of smti in which
the graph is complete. In [9] Manlove extended the algorithm to general smti instances,
obtaining O(m2) runtime. In [7] Kavitha, Mehlhorn, Michail and Paluch gave an O(nm)
algorithm for the problem. Several structural results related to the problem in instances of
smti have been given. In [10] the set of strongly stable matchings has been shown to form a
distributive lattice (defined in Preliminaries). Recently, in [8] Ghosal, Kunysz and Paluch
characterised the set of strongly stable matchings. They described an O(nm) algorithm for
constructing a partial order with O(m) elements representing the set of solutions to the
problem.
Contrary to the bipartite version of the problem, its non-bipartite generalisation has
not received much attention in the literature. The problem of computing a strongly stable
matching in non-bipartite instances of srti was first solved by Scott [16]. He obtained an
O(m2) algorithm for the problem (The algorithm contained some flaws that can be removed
using results from this paper). To the best of our knowledge no structural results related to
the problem have been published so far.
Our results. Scott [16] and Manlove [11] asked whether it was possible to use techniques
from [7] in order to speed up Scott’s algorithm for computing a single strongly stable matching
in instances of srti from O(m2) time to O(nm) time. We describe an O(nm) time algorithm
for the problem, however we would like to remark that our algorithm is not an extension
of Scott’s algorithm. Our approach is based on a simple reduction to the bipartite version
of the problem. Let I be an instance of srti, and G = (V,E) be an underlying graph. We
define an auxiliary instance I ′ of smti along with its underlying graph G′ = (A ∪ B,E′)
as follows. We make two copies vp ∈ A and vr ∈ B of each vertex v ∈ V . For each edge
{v, w} ∈ E we add (vp, wr) and (wp, vr) to E′. Preference lists in I ′ are inherited from
preference lists in I. Most of the strongly stable matchings in G′ correspond to certain cycles
in G, however a deep understanding of the structure of the bipartite instance I ′ allows us
to filter out matchings which do not correspond to strongly stable matchings in G. This
approach allows us not only to obtain a faster algorithm for computing a single strongly
stable matching, but also to characterise the set of all strongly stable matchings in instances
of srti. Our characterisation is based on the construction of a certain partial order with
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O(m) elements which allows us to represent all the strongly stable matchings. No such
characterisation has been known so far in this setting, however we would like to remark
that our construction resembles the one given by Gusfield and Irving [3] for instances of sri.
The presented characterisation can be used to solve a number of problems connected with
strongly stable matchings such as enumeration of strongly stable matchings, the minimum
regret matching problem and the problem of computing all strongly stable pairs. We would
like to point out that we do not address these problems in the paper. The main advantage
of our approach is its simplicity. Due to the complicated nature of the problem, it would
require a lot of effort to extend Scott’s algorithm in order to achieve an O(nm) running
time for finding a single strongly stable matching and construct a representation of all the
strongly stable matchings. Our algorithms completely avoid the need for low level technical
details. The reduction to the bipartite version of the problem allows us also to construct an
alternative version of Irving’s algorithm [4] for computing stable matchings in instances of
sri. We remark that this has already been observed by Dean and Munshi in [1], where they
also use the bipartite formulation of the problem to obtain their results.
Related work. Depending on the way we define a blocking edge in an instance of srti we
can get two other versions of the stable matching problem. In the weakly stable matching
problem an edge e = (x, y) is blocking if by getting matched to each other both x and y
would become better off. In the super stable matching problem an edge e is said to be
blocking if neither x nor y would become worse off. A matching is respectively weakly stable
or super stable if no blocking edge exists with respect to it.
Super stable matchings in instances of srti were investigated by Irving and Manlove [6].
They gave an O(m) time algorithm for finding a super stable matching or reporting that no
such matching exists. The algorithm is an extension of Irving’s algorithms for finding stable
matching in the sri setting [4] and for finding super stable matching in instances of smti [5].
Using a polynomial time reduction from srti under super stability to 2-SAT , Fleiner, Irving
and Manlove [2] deduced a number of structural results involving super stable matchings.
These structural results allowed authors to give algorithms for computing all super stable
pairs, enumeration of super stable matchings and finding a minimum regret super stable
matching.
In contrast to strongly stable matchings and super stable matchings, the problem of
determining whether a weakly stable matching exists in a non-bipartite graph was proven
to be NP -complete by Ronn [15]. He proved that NP -completeness holds even if each
preference list is either strictly ordered or contains a tie of length 2 at the head.
2 Preliminaries
We start with some additional notation. Let I be an instance of either smti or srti. Denote
the set of all strongly stable matchings in I by M(I). Denote by V (I), E(I) the set of
vertices and edges respectively of the underlying graph of I. We say that an instance I is
solvable if there is a strongly stable matching in the underlying graph. We define the rank of
w in v’s preference list, denoted by rank(v, w), to be 1 plus the number of ties which are
preferred to w by v. If I is a an instance of smti, then the underlying bipartite graph is of
the form G = (A ∪B,E). As is customary we call the vertices of A and B respectively men
and women.
Below we give an overview of known structural results related to strongly stable matchings
in bipartite graphs.
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I Theorem 1 ([7]). There is an O(nm) algorithm to determine a man-optimal strongly
stable matching of the given instance or report that no such matching exists.
We say that a matching is man-optimal if every man gets the best partner among all his
possible partners in any strongly stable matching. It can be proven that such a matching
always exists if a given instance is solvable.
I Theorem 2 (Rural Hospitals Theorem [9]). In a given instance of smti, the same vertices
are matched in all strongly stable matchings.
We define an equivalence relation ∼ onM(I) as follows.
I Definition 3. For two strongly stable matchingsM and N , M ∼ N if and only if each man
m is indifferent between M(m) and N(m). Denote by [M ] the equivalence class containing
M and denote by X the set of equivalence classes ofM(I) under ∼.
Note that if there are no ties in the instance i.e. I is an instance of smi, then each
equivalence class of ∼ contains exactly one matching. It turns out that if ties are present
in the instance, then an equivalence class can contain exponentially many matchings. To
see that consider any bipartite graph G which admits a perfect matching. We construct an
instance J of smti from G such that the preference list of every vertex is a single tie. Note
that perfect matchings in G are strongly stable in J and all perfect matchings belong to the
same equivalence class. If G admits exponentially many perfect matchings, then there are
exponentially many strongly stable matchings in J as well.
Strongly stable matchings belonging to the same equivalence class can be easily char-
acterised (more details in [10]). Thus we focus on structural results related to the set of
equivalence classes of ∼.
For two strongly stable matchings M and N we say that M dominates N and write
N M if each man m weakly prefers M(m) to N(m). If M dominates N and there exists a
man m who prefers M(m) to N(m) then we say that M strictly dominates N and we call N
a successor of M .
Next we define a partial order ∗ on X .
I Definition 4. For any two equivalence classes [M ] and [N ], [M ] ∗ [N ] if and only if
M  N .
Let M and N be two strongly stable matchings. Consider the symmetric difference
M ⊕N . By Theorem 2 this set contains only alternating cycles. These cycles display an
interesting property captured in:
I Lemma 5 ([10]). Let M and N be two strongly stable matchings. Consider any alternating
cycle C of M ⊕ N . Let (m0, w0,m1, w1, ...,mk−1, wk−1) be the sequence of vertices of C
where mi are men and wi are women. Then there are only three possibilities:
(∀mi)wi =mi wi+1 and (∀wi)mi =wi mi−1
(∀mi)wi ≺mi wi+1 and (∀wi)mi wi mi−1
(∀mi)wi mi wi+1 and (∀wi)mi ≺wi mi−1
Subscripts are taken modulo k.
Below we introduce two operations transforming pairs of strongly stable matchings into other
strongly stable matchings.
I Definition 6. Let M and N be two strongly stable matchings. Consider any man m and
his partners M(m) and N(m).
By M ∧N we denote the matching such that:
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if M(m) m N(m) then (m,M(m)) ∈M ∧N
if M(m) ≺m N(m) then (m,N(m)) ∈M ∧N
Similarly by M ∨N we denote the matching such that:
if M(m) m N(m) then (m,N(m)) ∈M ∨N
if M(m) m N(m) then (m,M(m)) ∈M ∨N
From [10] it follows that both M ∨ N and M ∧ N are strongly stable matchings, and
M,N M ∨N and M,N M ∧N .
We extend operations ∨ and ∧ to the set X of equivalence classes. Let [M ], [N ] ∈ X .
Denote [M ] ∨ [N ] = [M ∨N ], [M ] ∧ [N ] = [M ∧N ].
A lattice is a partially ordered set in which every two elements a, b have a unique infimum
(denoted a ∨ b) and a unique supremum (denoted a ∧ b). A lattice L with operations
join ∨ and meet ∧ is distributive if for any three elements x, y, z of L the following holds:
x ∧ (y ∨ z) = (x ∧ y) ∨ (x ∧ z).
I Theorem 7 ([10]). The partial order (X ,∗) with operations meet ∨ and join ∧ defined
above forms a distributive lattice.
It is easy to give an example such that X is of exponential size. It turns out that it
is possible to build a representation of the lattice which is of polynomial size. In order to
describe its construction a few more definitions are needed.
I Definition 8. Let M and N be two strongly stable matchings such that N ≺M . We say
that N is a strict successor of M if and only if there is no strongly stable matching M ′
such that N ≺M ′ ≺M .
Let M0 be a man-optimal strongly stable matching, and let Mz be a woman optimal
strongly stable matching. We call a sequence (M0,M1, . . . ,Mz) such that M0 M1  . . . 
Mz and Mi+1 is a strict successor of Mi, a maximal sequence of strongly stable matchings.
I Theorem 9 ([8]). There is an O(nm) time algorithm to compute a maximal sequence of
strongly stable matchings.
This algorithm works as follows. We first compute a man-optimal matching M0 in O(nm)
time using the standard algorithm [7], then given a matching Mi we find a strict successor
Mi+1 or determine that Mi is a woman-optimal matching (more details in [8]). We iterate
over i until we reach a woman-optimal matching. Using amortized analysis it can be proven
that the algorithm runs in O(nm) time. The algorithm can be easily modified so that it
starts with an arbitrary strongly stable matching instead of a man-optimal one.
I Corollary 10. Let M0 be a strongly stable matching. There is an O(nm) algorithm
to compute a sequence of strongly stable matchings (M0,M1, . . . ,Mk) such that Mk is a
woman-optimal matching, and Mi+1 is a strict successor of Mi for each i.
An important property of this algorithm is that in successive matchings each vertex either
stays matched to the same partner or gets a partner of a different rank.
I Corollary 11. Let S = (M0,M1, . . . ,Mz) be any sequence of strongly stable matchings
produced by the algorithm of Corollary 10. Then for each v ∈ V (I) and i < z we have either
Mi(v) = Mi+1(v) or rank(v,Mi(v)) 6= rank(v,Mi+1(v)).
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Let M and N be two strongly stable matchings such that N is a strict successor of
M . Recall that M ⊕N is a set of alternating cycles. Consider some matchings M ′ ∈ [M ],
N ′ ∈ [N ]. Depending on the choice of matchings M ′ and N ′ it might happen that M ⊕N 6=
M ′ ⊕ N ′. Note that from the definition of ∼ it follows that for every vertex v we have
rank(v,M(v))− rank(v,N(v)) = rank(v,M ′(v))− rank(v,N ′(v)). In other words when we
transform a matching from [M ] into some matching from [N ] the change of v’s rank does
not depend on the choice of matchings from equivalence classes. This observation motivates
the following definition.
I Definition 12. Let M and N be two strongly stable matchings such that N is a strict
successor ofM . For any vertex v denote rv = rank(v,M(v)) and r′v = rank(v,N(v)). We say
that a set of triples ρ([M ], [N ]) = {(v, rv, r′v) : v ∈ V (I), rv 6= r′v} is a rotation transforming
[M ] into [N ].
Let ρ be a rotation and M,N be two strongly stable matchings such that N is a strict
successor of M . We say that the set of alternating cycles M ⊕ N realizes a rotation ρ if
ρ = ρ([M ], [N ]). As noted above there are potentially many sets of cycles realizing a given
rotation. A rotation ρ is exposed in [M ] if ρ = ρ([M ], [N ]) for some N which is a strict
successor of M . We say that such a rotation transforms [M ] into [N ]. Note that a given
rotation may be exposed in many equivalence classes.
I Theorem 13 ([8]). Let S = (M0,M1, . . . ,Mz) be a maximal sequence of strongly stable
matchings. For i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , z − 1} denote ρi = ρ([Mi], [Mi+1]). Then the set D(I) =
{ρ0, ρ1, . . . , ρz−1} does not depend on the choice of S, and ρi 6= ρj for i 6= j.
Note that given a maximal sequence of strongly stable matchings (M0,M1, . . . ,Mz) we
can easily compute rotations (ρ0, ρ1, . . . , ρz−1) where ρi = ρ([Mi], [Mi+1]). Moreover the set
Cρi = Mi ⊕Mi+1 realizes ρi for each i. It is important to note that depending on the choice
of the maximal sequence S alternating cycles in Cρi may differ.
Let v ∈ V (I), and let ρ be a rotation. If (v, f, s) ∈ ρ, then we say that ρ moves v from
rank f to rank s. If a particular maximal sequence of strongly stable matchings S is given
and ρ = ρ([Mi], [Mi+1]) for some i then we say that a rotation ρ moves v from Mi(v) to
Mi+1(v).
Note that in an instance of smi for each rotation there is exactly one set of alternating
cycles realizing this rotation. This follows easily from the definition of a rotation and the
fact that each equivalence class consists of exactly one matching. It can be proven that in
this setting a set of cycles realizing a given rotation always consists of one cycle. Thus in an
instance of smi a rotation can be viewed as a single cycle. In the more general smti setting
it may happen that a set of cycles realizing a given rotation consists of more than one cycle
(Figure 1).
I Definition 14. Let D(I) be the set of all rotations in a given instance I. We define the
order ≺ on elements of D(I) as follows. We say that a rotation ρ precedes rotation ρ′ and
write ρ ≺ ρ′ if and only if for every maximal sequence S = (M0,M1, . . . ,Mz) of strongly
stable matchings we have ρ = ρ([Mi], [Mi+1]) and ρ′ = ρ([Mj ], [Mj+1]) for some i, j such
that i < j.
Let Z be a subset of D(I). We say that Z is a closed set if there is no ρ ∈ D(I) \ Z
such that ρ ≺ ρ′ for some ρ′ ∈ Z. It turns out that each closed set corresponds to an
equivalence class of ∼. Moreover given such a set we can efficiently find an equivalence class
corresponding to it. We briefly explain how to do it.
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Figure 1 An example instance of smti is presented on the left hand side. Natural numbers
denote ranks of the corresponding edges. This instance admits two strongly stable matchings
M1 = {(a, b), (c, d), (e, f), (g, h)} and M2 = {(a, d), (c, b), (e, h), (g, f)}. Cycles realizing the only
rotation are presented on the right hand side.
First assume that we are given some particular maximal sequence S = (M0,M1, . . . ,Mz) of
strongly stable matchings, the set of rotations D(I), and for each rotation ρi = ρ([Mi], [Mi+1])
a set of cycles Cρi = Mi ⊕Mi+1 realizing it.
I Definition 15. Let Z = {ρa0 , ρa1 , . . . , ρak−1} be a closed set. We order its elements so
that there are no i, j such that i < j and ρai  ρaj . Let N0 = M0, Ni+1 = Ni ⊕ Cρai . We
denote fS(Z) = Nk.
Note that the sequence {Ni} depends on the ordering of elements of Z, however its last
element fS(Z) = M0 ⊕ Cρa0 ⊕ Cρa1 ⊕ . . .⊕ Cρak−1 is the same regardless of the ordering.
Intuition behind this definition is as follows. We start with an equivalence class [N0]
(N0 = M0), and some ordering of elements of Z. First we apply a rotation ρa0 and get a
matching N1 = N0⊕Cρa0 belonging to [N1]. Then we apply ρa1 to N1 and get N2 = N1⊕Cρa1
belonging to [N2]. We continue this process until we apply all the rotations. In the end we
get a matching fS(Z) = Nk, and a class [Nk]. Note that depending on the ordering of Z,
sequences {Ni} may go through different equivalence classes, however all possible orderings
result in the same matching Nk, and an equivalence class [Nk].
The next lemma says that every equivalence class can be obtained in this way from some
closed set of rotations.
I Lemma 16. For each equivalence class [M ] there is a closed set X such that fS(X) ∈ [M ].
Let Z1 and Z2 be closed sets. Then Z1 6= Z2 implies that [fS(Z1)] 6= [fS(Z2)].
For each closed set Z we define gS(Z) = [fS(Z)]. It can be proven that gS does not
depend on the choice of S and that gS is a bijection between closed sets of D(I,≺) and the
set X . The above discussion is summarized in the following theorem.
I Theorem 17 ([8]). There is a one-to-one correspondence between the set X of equivalence
classes of ∼ and the closed sets of (D(I),≺).
It is important to note that given the function fS we can get one strongly stable matching
from each equivalence class and that depending on the choice of S these matchings may differ.
In other words if S 6= S ′ then it may happen that fS(Z) 6= fS′(Z) for some Z, however
regardless of the choice of S and S ′ we have [fS(Z)] = [fS′(Z)]. We emphasize this fact as
our algorithm for the non-bipartite version of the problem is based on it.
Note that from Definition 14 alone it is non-trivial how to efficiently construct the relation
≺ on D(I). Construction of an explicit representation of the relation ≺ would take Ω(m2)
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time, because D(I) might have Ω(m) elements. It can be proven that we can efficiently
construct a sparse subgraph of (D(I),≺) such that the closed sets of these two posets are
identical.
I Theorem 18 ([8]). There is a graph G′ = (D(I), E′) such that |E′| = O(m), and the
closed sets in G′ are exactly the same as the closed sets in the poset (D(I),≺). Such a graph
can be constructed in O(nm) time.
3 The Strongly Stable Roommates Problem
Let I be an instance of srti and let G = (V,E) be the underlying graph. We define an
auxiliary instance I ′ of smti and its underlying bipartite graph H = (A ∪B,E′). We make
two copies of each vertex v ∈ V (G), vp ∈ A – a proposing node and vr ∈ B – a responding
node. For each edge {v, w} ∈ E we add two edges (vp, wr) and (wp, vr) to E′. Each node in
H inherits its preference list from the original instance i.e. for each edge {v, w} ∈ E we have
rank(vp, wr) = rank(v, w) and rank(wr, vp) = rank(w, v). Following the notation from [3]
we denote edges of non-bipartite graphs as {x, y} rather than (x, y) to emphasise the fact
that pairs are unordered.
In the next few lemmas we show that we can derive some useful properties of the structure
of strongly stable matchings in I from the structure of I ′. Throughout this section we
assume that I is an instance of srti and that I ′ is defined as above.
I Definition 19. Let M be a matching in I ′. We say that M is a symmetric matching
if for each edge (v, w) ∈ E we have (vp, wr) ∈M ⇐⇒ (wp, vr) ∈M .
I Lemma 20. There is a one-to-one correspondence between strongly stable matchings in I
and symmetric strongly stable matchings in I ′.
Proof. Let M be a strongly stable matching in I. Let M ′ be a symmetric matching such
that for each {v, w} ∈ M we add (vp, wr) and (wp, vr) to M ′. We can easily see that M ′
is strongly stable. If there was some edge (xp, yr) blocking M ′ then M would be blocked
by {x, y}. Similarly we can see that for each symmetric strongly stable matching M in I ′
there is a corresponding strongly stable matching M ′ in I. For each (vr, wp) ∈M we add
{v, w} to M ′. Stability of M ′ is simple to establish. It is obvious that it is a one-to-one
correspondence. J
Let M be a strongly stable matching M in I. We denote its symmetric counterpart
in I ′ by s(M). One can easily see that the equivalence class [s(M)] might contain some
matchings which are not symmetric. Moreover, some classes may not contain any symmetric
matchings. For instance let M be a matching in I ′ such that for some vertex v ∈ V (I) we
have rank(vp,M(vp)) 6= rank(vr,M(vr)). It is clear that none of the matchings from [M ]
can be symmetric. This observation leads to the following definition.
I Definition 21. Let M be a strongly stable matching in I ′. We say that the class [M ] is
symmetric if for each v ∈ V (I) we have rank(vp,M(vp)) = rank(vr,M(vr)).
It is obvious that if M is a symmetric matching then [M ] is also symmetric. Note that if
a matching belongs to a symmetric equivalence class it does not imply that it is actually a
symmetric matching. Do all the symmetric equivalence classes contain at least one symmetric
matching? It turns out that the answer to this question is negative. A counterexample is
presented in Figure 2. It turns out that the following theorem holds:
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Figure 2 An example of an unsolvable instance I of srti. There are four strongly stable matchings
in the corresponding auxiliary instance I′ of smti:
M1 = {(ap, br), (bp, cr), (cp, ar), (dp, er), (ep, fr), (fp, gr), (gp, dr)}
M2 = {(ap, br), (bp, cr), (cp, ar), (dp, er), (ep, dr), (fp, gr), (gp, fr)}
M3 = {(ap, br), (bp, cr), (cp, ar), (dp, gr), (gp, dr), (ep, fr), (fp, er)}
M4 = {(ap, br), (bp, cr), (cp, ar), (dp, gr), (gp, fr), (fp, er), (ep, dr)}
Matchings M2 and M3 belong to symmetric equivalence classes but neither of them is symmetric.
I Theorem 22. An instance I is solvable if and only if the following hold:
at least one symmetric equivalence class exists in I ′
each symmetric equivalence class in I ′ contains at least one symmetric strongly stable
matching
The above theorem implies that if we find a symmetric equivalence class which does not
contain any symmetric matching, then the instance is unsolvable. Moreover if we find a
strongly stable matching in a given instance I then every single symmetric equivalence class
of I ′ contains at least one symmetric matching. Note that the above theorem is somewhat
trivial in the case of strict preferences. In an instance of smi each equivalence class contains
exactly one matching. There are no ties, thus M is symmetric if and only if [M ] is symmetric.
In order to prove Theorem 22 we are going to make use of the function fS (Definition 15).
It turns out that if an instance I is solvable, then we can pick a maximal sequence S such
that if a closed set Z corresponds to a symmetric equivalence class, then fS(Z) is a symmetric
matching. Below we give a candidate for such a sequence.
Denote q(vr) = vp and q(vp) = vr for v ∈ V (I). For a given matching M in I ′ we denote
S(M) = {(q(w), q(v)) : (v, w) ∈M}.
I Definition 23. We say that a maximal sequence of strongly stable matchings S =
(M0,M1, . . .M2k) is symmetric if Mk is a symmetric matching and S(Mi) = M2k−i for
each i.
It turns out that if a given instance of I ′ admits a symmetric strongly stable matching,
then there is a symmetric maximal sequence of strongly stable matchings containing this
matching.
I Lemma 24. Let Mk be a woman-optimal matching in I ′, M0 be a symmetric strongly
stable matching, and let (M0,M1, . . . ,Mk) be a sequence of strongly stable matchings such
that Mi+1 is a strict successor of Mi. Then the sequence:
Q = (S(Mk), S(Mk−1), . . . , S(M1),M0,M1, . . . ,Mk)
is a symmetric maximal sequence of strongly stable matchings.
Proof. It suffices to prove that for each i the matching S(Mi) is strongly stable, S(Mk) is
man-optimal, and that S(Mi−1) is a strict successor of S(Mi). Strong stability of S(Mi)
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follows easily from strong stability of Mi. If there was an edge (vp, wr) blocking S(Mi)
then (wp, vr) would block Mi. It can be easily proven that for any two strongly stable
matchings N,N ′ we have N ≺ N ′ ⇐⇒ S(N ′) ≺ S(N). If there was a matching N such that
S(Mk) ≺ N , then S(N) ≺Mk would hold, thus Mk would not be woman-optimal. Similarly
if there was a strongly stable matching M ′ such that S(Mi)  M ′  S(Mi−1), then there
would be Mi−1  S(M ′)  Mi. This would contradict the assumption that Mi is a strict
successor of Mi−1. Thus for each i the matching S(Mi−1) is a strict successor of S(Mi).
Hence Q is a symmetric maximal sequence of strongly stable matchings. J
Corollary 10 along with the proof of Lemma 24 imply that given a symmetric strongly
stable matching M in I ′ we can compute a symmetric maximal sequence of strongly stable
matchings.
I Corollary 25. Assume that we are given a symmetric strongly stable matching M in I ′.
Then there exists a symmetric maximal sequence of strongly stable matchings
(M0,M1, . . . ,M2k) such that Mk = M . We can compute such a sequence in O(nm) time.
Before we prove Theorem 22 we need to investigate the structure of the set of rota-
tions D(I ′). Let M be a symmetric strongly stable matching. Consider a symmetric
sequence of strongly stable matchings S = (M0,M1, . . . ,M2k) such that Mk = M . Let
ρi = ρ([Mi], [Mi+1]) for each i. Theorem 13 implies that D(I ′) = {ρ0, ρ1, . . . , ρ2k−1}. From
Theorem 17 we know that the set Z = {ρ0, ρ1, . . . , ρk−1} is closed and it corresponds to
the equivalence class [M ]. It turns out that the set of remaining rotations D(I ′) \ Z has
very similar structure to Z. In order to see this we consider matchings Mi, Mi+1 and their
symmetric counterparts M2k−i = S(Mi), M2k−i−1 = S(Mi+1). Let v ∈ V (I), wr1 = Mi(vp),
and wr2 = Mi+1(vp). Observe that rotation ρi moves vp from wr1 to wr2. We can easily see
that ρ2k−i−1 moves vr from wp2 to w
p
1 . This observation motivates the following definition.
For a given rotation ρ in I ′ we denote ρ = {(q(v), s, f) : (v, f, s) ∈ ρ}. Similarly for a
given cycle C in I ′ we denote C = {(q(w), q(v)) : (v, w) ∈ C}. We say that ρ is the rotation
dual to ρ. Analogously for a given cycle C we say that C is the cycle dual to C. Note that
the rotation dual to ρ is equal to ρ. Similarly the cycle dual to C is equal to C. We say that
the set of all rotations D(I ′) is symmetric if for each ρ ∈ D(I ′) both ρ ∈ D(I ′) and ρ 6= ρ
hold.
I Theorem 26. If I is solvable, then the set of rotations D(I ′) is symmetric.
Proof. Let S = (M0,M1, . . . ,M2k) be a symmetric maximal sequence of strongly stable
matchings. Such a sequence exists from Corollary 25. Denote ρi = ρ([Mi], [Mi+1]) for each
i. From Theorem 13 we know that D(I ′) = {ρ0, ρ1, . . . , ρ2k−1}, and that ρi 6= ρj for i 6= j.
One can easily check that ρi is dual to ρ2k−i−1 for each i. Thus D(I ′) is symmetric. J
From the above theorem we know that if D(I ′) is not symmetric, then for sure I does
not admit any strongly stable matching. From Theorems 9 and 13 we know how to compute
the set D(I ′) in O(nm) time. We can easily check if this set is symmetric.
I Corollary 27. There is an O(nm) algorithm to determine if D(I ′) is symmetric.
It turns out that if the set D(I ′) is symmetric then we can characterise the set of
symmetric equivalence classes of I ′. We say that a set Z ⊆ D(I ′) is complete if for each
rotation ρ ∈ D(I ′) either ρ ∈ Z or ρ ∈ Z. Similarly to Lemma 16, for a given maximal
sequence S we consider the function fS (Definition 15) however this time we restrict its
domain to the set of complete closed sets.
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I Lemma 28. Let D(I ′) be symmetric, S = (M0,M1, . . . ,Mz) be any maximal sequence
of strongly stable matchings. For each set Z ⊆ D(I ′) which is complete and closed fS(Z)
belongs to a symmetric equivalence class. Moreover for each symmetric equivalence class [M ]
there is a closed and complete set Z such that fS(Z) ∈ [M ].
Proof. Let Z be a complete and closed set of rotations. We prove that fS(Z) belongs to a
symmetric equivalence class. First let us order rotations of Z = {ρ0, ρ1, . . . , ρk}, so that if
i < j, then ρi  ρj . Then we denote N0 = M0, Ni+1 = Ni ⊕ Cρi for 0 ≤ i < k. From the
definition of rotation it follows that Ni+1 is a strict successor of Ni. Consider an arbitrary
vertex v ∈ V (I). In order to prove that fS(Z) belongs to a symmetric equivalence class we
need to show that rank(vp, Nk(vp)) = rank(vr, Nk(vr)). For each i the rotation ρi moves
vp from Ni(vp) to Ni+1(vp), thus Z moves vp from N0(vp) to Nk(vp). From the definition
of dual rotation we know that ρi moves vr from q(Ni+1(vp)) to q(Ni(vp)), hence D(I ′) \ Z
moves vr from q(Nk(vp)) to q(N0(vp)) From the completeness of Z we obtain that Z moves vr
from N0(vr) to q(Nk(vp)). Thus rank(vr, Nk(vr)) = rank(vr, q(Nk(vp)) = rank(vp, Nk(vp)),
hence fS(Z) belongs to a symmetric equivalence class.
Let [M ] be a symmetric equivalence class. We prove that there is a closed and complete
set Z such that fS(Z) ∈ [M ]. From Lemma 24 there exists a symmetric maximal sequence of
strongly stable matchings (M0,M1, . . . ,M2k) such that M = Mk. Analogously to the proof
of Theorem 26 we denote ρi = ρ([Mi], [Mi+1]) for each i. From Theorem 13 we know that
D(I ′) = {ρ0, ρ1, . . . , ρ2k−1}. Consider the set Z = {ρ0, ρ1, . . . , ρk−1}. This set is obviously
closed. One can easily check that ρi is dual to ρ2k−i−1, thus Z is complete. From Theorem 17
we have fS(Z) ∈ [M ]. J
Analogously to Theorem 17 we consider a function gS(Z) = [fS(Z)] and obtain the
following theorem.
I Theorem 29. There is a one-to-one correspondence between the symmetric equivalence
classes and the complete closed subsets of rotations in (D(I ′),≺).
It may happen that the set of rotations is symmetric but none of the symmetric classes
contains a symmetric strongly stable matching (Figure 2). If an instance I is solvable, then
we can pick a maximal sequence S of strongly stable matchings, such that all values of the
function fS are symmetric strongly stable matchings. Note that this implies Theorem 22
and allows us to characterise strongly stable matchings in a non-bipartite instance I. Below
we prove that it suffices to take a sequence obtained from Corollary 25 as S.
I Theorem 30. Let Q = (M0,M1, . . . ,M2k) be a symmetric maximal sequence of strongly
stable matchings obtained as in Corollary 25. For each complete and closed set Z of rotations
fQ(Z) is a symmetric matching.
Proof. Let Z be a closed and complete set of rotations. Denote M = fQ(Z). Let v ∈ V (I)
be any vertex, and let M(vp) = wr. Our goal is to prove that M(vr) = wp. From
Lemma 28 we know thatM belongs to a symmetric equivalence class, thus rank(vp,M(vp)) =
rank(vr,M(vr)). Denote this rank by r. From the definition of fQ if an edge belongs to
M then it must belong to one of the matchings Mi. Recall that since Q is a sequence
obtained from Corollary 25 we have that for each i, and a vertex x either Mi(x) = Mi+1(x)
or rank(x,Mi(x)) 6= rank(x,Mi+1(x)) (Corollary 11). This observation, and the fact that
M0 M1  . . . M2k imply that there exists exactly one vertex of rank r matched to vp
amongst all vertices matched to vp in matchings of Q. Let us denote this vertex by wr, and
assume that Mj(vp) = wr for some j. Similarly it can be proven that there exists exactly
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Algorithm 1 for computing a symmetric equivalence class
1: let I ′ be an auxiliary symmetric instance of smti
2: if I ′ is unsolvable or D(I ′) is not symmetric then
3: return no
4: build a graph G′ representing the poset of rotations (Theorem 18)
5: Z ← ∅
6: for ρ : ρ ∈ D(I ′) do
7: indeg(ρ)← 0
8: marked(ρ)← 0
9: for ρ : ρ ∈ D(I ′) do
10: for ρ′ : (ρ, ρ′) ∈ G′ do
11: indeg(ρ′)← indeg(ρ′) + 1
12: Q← {ρ ∈ D(I ′) : indeg(ρ) = 0}
13: while Q 6= ∅ do
14: ρ← any element from Q
15: Q← Q \ ρ
16: if marked(ρ) = 0 then
17: Z ← Z ∪ {ρ}
18: marked(ρ)← 1
19: for ρ′ : (ρ, ρ′) ∈ G′ do
20: indeg(ρ′)← indeg(ρ′)− 1
21: if indeg(ρ′) = 0 then
22: Q← Q ∪ {ρ′}
23: return a matching corresponding to Z
one vertex of rank r matched to vr amongst all vertices matched to vr in matchings of Q.
The fact that Q is symmetric implies that M2k−j(vr) = wp, so vr must be matched to wp in
M . This implies that M is a symmetric matching. J
Assuming that we are given one symmetric matching in I ′ we can efficiently construct fQ
as shown in Corollary 25. It remains to show how to find some symmetric equivalence class
and check if there exists a symmetric matching belonging to this class. If such a matching
does not exist then Theorem 22 implies that I is unsolvable.
Algorithm 1 for determining a symmetric equivalence class works as follows. We first
build the symmetric instance I ′. If this instance is unsolvable or D(I ′) is not symmetric
then I is unsolvable from Theorem 26. From now on we assume that D(I ′) is symmetric.
We prove that in this case we can find a symmetric equivalence class in I ′. The intuition
behind the algorithm is very simple. We first construct a set Z which is closed and complete.
Initially we set Z = ∅. During each step of the algorithm we add to Z some rotations ρ such
that there does not exist any rotation ρ′ /∈ Z such that ρ′ ≺ ρ. It is enough to make sure
that Z is closed at all times of the execution. In order to make sure that the resulting set is
complete, when we add a rotation ρ to Z we mark ρ, and never add any marked rotations to
Z. Once the set Z is constructed we use Theorem 29 to obtain a symmetric equivalence class
corresponding to it. Before we prove the correctness of the algorithm we need the following
technical lemma.
I Lemma 31. Let ρ, ρ′ ∈ D(I ′) be two rotations such that ρ ≺ ρ′. Then ρ′ ≺ ρ holds.
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Proof. Assume that ρ′ ≺ ρ does not hold. From the definition of ≺ we know that there
exists a maximal sequence of strongly stable matchings S = (M0,M1, . . . ,M2k) such that
ρ′ = ρj , ρ = ρl for some l < j, where we denote ρi = ρ([Mi], [Mi+1]) for each i. One can
easily see that S ′ = (S(M2k), S(M2k−1), . . . , S(M0)) is also a maximal sequence of strongly
stable matchings. It can be proven that ρi = ρ([S(Mi+1)], [S(Mi)]) for each i. Thus ρ′ = ρj
and ρ = ρl – a contradiction with the definition of ≺. J
Correctness of the algorithm is proven in the following theorem.
I Theorem 32. Let I be an instance of srti, and let I ′ be the auxiliary instance of smti.
Algorithm 1 determines a matching belonging to a symmetric equivalence class of I ′ or reports
that such a matching does not exist. The runtime of the algorithm is bounded by O(nm).
Proof. It is clear from Theorem 26 that if the algorithm returns no in line 4, then I is
unsolvable.
We first prove that Z is closed. Closed sets in the poset (D(I ′),≺), and in G′ are identical,
hence it suffices to prove that Z is closed in G′. At the start of the execution we have Z = ∅,
so Z is closed. A rotation can be added to Z only if all its immediate predecessors in G′
have already been added to Z. It implies that when a rotation is added to Z this set remains
closed, hence Z is closed during the entire execution of the algorithm.
We prove that Z is complete when we exit the while loop (lines 14− 23). Assume to the
contrary that Z is not complete. Then there is some rotation ρ such that ρ, ρ /∈ Z. From the
pseudocode we can see that neither ρ nor ρ is marked. Since ρ /∈ Z there exists some rotation
ρ′ such that (ρ′, ρ) ∈ G′ and ρ′ /∈ Z, otherwise at some point ρ would have been added to Q
in the line 23, and either ρ or ρ would be added to Z. If ρ′ is marked then ρ′ ∈ Z. From
Lemma 31 we know that ρ′ ≺ ρ implies that ρ ≺ ρ′ – a contradiction with the fact that Z is
closed. Hence ρ′ cannot be marked. The rotation ρ′ is also unmarked, because ρ′ /∈ Z. We
can do the same reasoning for ρ′ and ρ′ and get another rotation ρ′′ /∈ Z, such that ρ′′ /∈ Z
and neither ρ′′ nor ρ′′ is marked. We continue this process building a sequence of rotations
ρ  ρ′  ρ′′  . . ., and we eventually get a contradiction because our poset is finite. Thus Z
is complete, and it corresponds to a symmetric equivalence class.
Let us estimate the complexity of the algorithm. From Corollary 27 we know that
computations in lines 3 − 4 take O(nm) time. Then we build a graph G′ in time O(nm)
(Theorem 18). Number of operations performed in lines 14 − 23 is proportional to the
number of edges of G′, which is bounded by O(nm). Thus the algorithm runs in O(nm)
time overall. J
The last step of the algorithm is to show how to determine if a symmetric matching exists
in a given symmetric equivalence class.
I Theorem 33. Let M be a strongly stable matching belonging to a symmetric equivalence
class. We can determine in O(√nm) time if there is a symmetric strongly stable matching
belonging to [M ].
Proof. We will construct a subgraph G′ = (V ′, E′) of G (recall that G is the underlying
graph of I) such that perfect matchings in G′ correspond to symmetric matchings in [M ].
Let us consider a matching M . For each v ∈ V (I) such that vp and vr are matched in M we
add v to V ′. We also add to E′ each edge (v, w) such that rank(v,M(v)) = rank(v, w) and
rank(w, v) = rank(w,M(w)). Similarly to the proof of Lemma 20 it can be shown that each
symmetric matching in [M ] corresponds to a perfect matching in G′. It remains to compute
a maximum matching in the non-bipartite graph G′ [12]. J
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The algorithm for computing a single strongly stable matching follows easily from the
above discussion. Given an instance I of srti, we first use Algorithm 1 in order to compute
a strongly stable matching M belonging to a symmetric equivalence class in an auxiliary
instance I ′. Then from Theorem 33 we determine a symmetric matching belonging to [M ],
and output its counterpart in I. Thus we obtain the following theorem:
I Theorem 34. There is an O(nm) time algorithm to determine a single strongly stable
matching in an instance of srti or to report that no such matching exists.
In the Introduction we mentioned that Scott’s O(m2) algorithm contained some flaws.
We explain the problem with his algorithm using our terminology. Scott’s algorithm can
correctly determine whether a symmetric equivalence class exists in an auxiliary instance
I ′. He claims that a symmetric strongly stable matching can always be found in a given
symmetric equivalence class (Lemma 3.3.4 in [16]). This is a false statement as we can see in
Figure 2. The algorithm can be repaired using for instance Theorem 33, however an analogue
of Theorem 22 is needed to prove its correctness.
Given a single strongly stable matching we can easily construct a representation of
the set of all strongly stable matchings. Using Corollary 25 we compute a symmetric
maximal sequence of strongly stable matchings and then construct the poset of rotations
as in Theorem 17. Closed and complete subsets of rotations correspond to strongly stable
matchings from Theorem 29 hence the following holds:
I Theorem 35. There is an O(nm) time algorithm to construct a poset (D(I ′),≺), such
that closed and complete subsets of D(I ′) correspond to symmetric equivalence classes of an
auxiliary instance I ′.
Acknowledgements. I would like to thank Katarzyna Paluch and the anonymous reviewers
for their helpful comments.
References
1 Brian C. Dean and Siddharth Munshi. Faster algorithms for stable allocation problems.
Algorithmica, 58(1):59–81, 2010. doi:10.1007/s00453-010-9416-y.
2 Tamás Fleiner, Robert W. Irving, and David F. Manlove. Efficient algorithms for gener-
alized stable marriage and roommates problems. Theor. Comput. Sci., 381(1-3):162–176,
2007. doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2007.04.029.
3 Dan Gusfield and Robert W. Irving. The Stable marriage problem – structure and al-
gorithms. Foundations of computing series. MIT Press, 1989.
4 Robert W. Irving. An efficient algorithm for the "stable roommates" problem. J. Algorithms,
6(4):577–595, 1985. doi:10.1016/0196-6774(85)90033-1.
5 Robert W. Irving. Stable marriage and indifference. Discrete Applied Mathematics,
48(3):261–272, 1994. doi:10.1016/0166-218X(92)00179-P.
6 Robert W. Irving and David F. Manlove. The stable roommates problem with ties. J.
Algorithms, 43(1):85–105, 2002. doi:10.1006/jagm.2002.1219.
7 Telikepalli Kavitha, Kurt Mehlhorn, Dimitrios Michail, and Katarzyna E. Paluch. Strongly
stable matchings in time O(nm) and extension to the hospitals-residents problem. ACM
Trans. Algorithms, 3(2), 2007. doi:10.1145/1240233.1240238.
8 Adam Kunysz, Katarzyna E. Paluch, and Pratik Ghosal. Characterisation of strongly
stable matchings. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium
on Discrete Algorithms, SODA 2016, Arlington, VA, USA, January 10-12, 2016, pages
107–119, 2016. doi:10.1137/1.9781611974331.ch8.
A. Kunysz 60:15
9 David F. Manlove. Stable marriage with ties and unacceptable partners. Technical report,
University of Glasgow, 1999.
10 David F. Manlove. The structure of stable marriage with indifference. Discrete Applied
Mathematics, 122(1-3):167–181, 2002. doi:10.1016/S0166-218X(01)00322-5.
11 David F. Manlove. Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences, volume 2 of Series on
Theoretical Computer Science. WorldScientific, 2013. doi:10.1142/8591.
12 Silvio Micali and Vijay V. Vazirani. An o(sqrt(|v|) |e|) algorithm for finding maximum
matching in general graphs. In 21st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer
Science, Syracuse, New York, USA, 13-15 October 1980, pages 17–27. IEEE Computer
Society, 1980. doi:10.1109/SFCS.1980.12.
13 Nitsan Perach, Julia Polak, and Uriel G. Rothblum. A stable matching model with an
entrance criterion applied to the assignment of students to dormitories at the technion. Int.
J. Game Theory, 36(3-4):519–535, 2008. doi:10.1007/s00182-007-0083-4.
14 Nitsan Perach and Uriel G. Rothblum. Incentive compatibility for the stable matching
model with an entrance criterion. Int. J. Game Theory, 39(4):657–667, 2010. doi:10.
1007/s00182-009-0210-5.
15 Eytan Ronn. Np-complete stable matching problems. J. Algorithms, 11(2):285–304, 1990.
doi:10.1016/0196-6774(90)90007-2.
16 Sandy Scott. A study of stable marriage problems with ties. PhD thesis, University of
Glasgow, 2005.
ESA 2016
